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"PROPERTY AND LAW ARE BORN AND MUST DIE 
TOGETHER"): THE HONORABLE DALE R. CATHELL'S 
PHILOSOPHY OF INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
AND THE GOVERNMENT IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
AND THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS, 1989-2007 
The Honorable Lynne A. Battagliat 
As a member of the Court of Appeals for the past six years, I 
have been fortunate to have as a colleague a judge whose breadth 
of knowledge of Maryland law in general, and property law in 
particular, is only matched by his warmth and wit. Although many 
may have experienced Judge Dale R. Cathell's gregarious presence 
on the bench, which encapsulates both his love of the law and 
people alike, few may be aware of the heart of a philosopher 
residing beneath the surface. 
Born in Berlin, Maryland, Judge Cathell joined the Maryland 
judiciary in 1980 upon his appointment to the District Court of 
Maryland in Worcester County.2 He subsequently became only 
the second judge to have been appointed and serve on all of the 
four courts in Maryland since the establishment of the Court of 
Special Appeals and the District Courts. 3 When he was appointed 
to the Court of Special Appeals in 1989, he was the first Worcester 
County judge to have been appointed to the appellate courts in 
more than 150 years. Cognizant of the parties' interests in a timely 
resolution of the issues presented to the Court, Judge Cathell has 
consistently demonstrated a tireless work ethic and has striven to 
publish his assigned opinions as promptly as possible.4 
In his time on the appellate bench, Judge Cathell has written on 
issues as wide ranging as the interaction between the Fourth 
Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and 
t Judge, Court of Appeals of Maryland. I would like to thank Amanda Lesher 
Olear for her research and analytical assistance, without which this piece would 
not have been possible. As for any errors or omissions, however, they are mine 
alone. This Article is dedicated to Judge Cathell's son, William Howard Cathell. 
I. JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL CODE (1843), reprinted in THE 
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 309 (John Bowring ed., Russell & Russell Inc. 
1962) (1843). 
2. Maryland Court of Appeals, http://www.msa.md.gov/msa/mdmanuaI/29ap/ 
htmVmsal1678.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2007). 
3. Maryland Court of Appeals, http://www.msa.md.gov/msa/mdmanuaV29ap/ 
html/msal1678.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2007). 
4. In the 178 majority opinions he has authored for the Court of Appeals as of the 
end of 2006, the average time from oral argument of the case to the filing of his 
opinions has been 1.6 months. Additionally, he authored 991 majority opinions 
in the Court of Special Appeals with similar diligence. 
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seizures and civil in rem forfeiture proceedings,5 to whether 
striking workers were entitled to unemployment benefits. 6 Judge 
Cathell also left his mark on criminal law/family law, 8 evidence,9 
and questions of the existence of probable cause under both the 
Federal and Maryland constitutions. 1o During his tenure on the 
5. One 1995 Corvette VIN# IGlYY22P585 103433 v. Mayor of BaIt., 353 Md. 114, 
724 A.2d 680 (1999) (determining that the exclusionary rule under the Fourth 
Amendment applies to civil in rem forfeiture proceedings). 
6. Giant Food, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor, Licensing, & Regulation, 356 Md. 180, 738 
A.2d 856 (1999) (holding that where unemployment results from a "stoppage of 
work" the employee is not entitled to unemployment benefits). 
7. See, e.g., Melton v. State, 379 Md. 471, 842 A.2d 743 (2004) (concluding that the 
statute governing the possession of a firearm by an individual prohibited by law 
could not result in mUltiple convictions for the possession of a single firearm); 
Jenkins v. State, 375 Md. 284, 825 A.2d 1008 (2003) (holding that a presumption 
of prejudice arose from non-incidental contact between a prosecution witness and 
a juror outside the courtroom); Galloway v. State, 371 Md. 379, 809 A.2d 653 
(2002) (concluding that inconsistent court and jury verdicts were impermissible); 
Handy v. State, 357 Md. 685, 745 A.2d 1107 (2000) (holding that pepper spray or 
mace can be considered a dangerous or deadly weapon within the meaning of 
robbery with a deadly weapon statute); Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400, 722 A.2d 
887 (1999) (holding that definition of "sexual abuse" includes the failure to 
prevent molestation or exploitation when it is reasonably possible to act and there 
exists a duty to do so). 
8. See, e.g., McDermott v. Dougherty, 385 Md. 320, 869 A.2d 751 (2005) (holding 
that the father's absence from his son's life due to the father's employment as a 
merchant marine did not constitute exceptional circumstances warranting 
awarding custody of the son to a third party); Laznovsky v. Laznovsky, 357 Md. 
586, 745 A.2d 1054 (2000) (stating that an assertion of parental fitness in a 
custody hearing does not waive psychiatrist-patient privilege); Drummond v. 
State, 350 Md. 502, 714 A.2d 163 (1998) (determining that although a non-
custodial parent may be entitled to a modification of his child support obligation 
due to the child's receipt of Social Security disability dependency benefits, the 
non-custodial parent is not entitled to an automatic credit against his child support 
obligations equal to the amount of benefits received by the child). 
9. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 368 Md. 320, 793 A.2d 561 (2002) (holding that the 
defendant in that case could not put the testimony of an impeachment witness 
before the jury); Germain v. State, 363 Md. 511, 769 A.2d 931 (2001) (holding 
that a pre-sentence investigation report may be used to refresh the recollection of 
a witness who would otherwise have a right to see it); Sessoms v. State, 357 Md. 
274, 744 A.2d 9 (2000) (concluding that the test for admitting evidence of other 
crimes does not apply to other crimes or wrongs committed by anyone other than 
the defendant and that evidence of the victim's reaction to a third party's 
statement to a police officer that the victim's brother just robbed him was 
admissible on cross-examination as probative of the victim's motive to lie); 
Wynn v. State, 351 Md. 307, 718 A.2d 588 (1998) (determining that evidence 
that the defendant committed crimes other than that for which he was on trial was 
not admissible under the "absence of mistake" exception to the other crimes rule); 
Hopkins v. State, 352 Md. 146,721 A.2d 231 (1998) (holding that a compelled 
voice exemplar is admissible). 
10. See, e.g., Southern v. State, 371 Md. 93, 807 A.2d 13 (2002) (holding that the 
State was not entitled to a limited remand to introduce new evidence on whether 
the police had probable cause to make the initial stop and arrest of the defendant); 
Wilkes v. State, 364 Md. 554, 774 A.2d 420 (2001) (stating that under the 
circumstances of the case the police did not improperly extend the duration of a 
traffic stop to permit a K-9 dog inspection of the car and that the police had 
probable cause to arrest the defendant). 
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Court of Appeals, Judge Cathell also has authored arguably some 
of the most important opinions addressing sensitive issues. II 
Judge Cathell's opinions concerning any of those topics would be 
worthy of examination. I have, however, chosen to focus my 
retrospective on Judge Cathell's contribution to Maryland law 
through his writings in the zoning and land use arena, in which he 
has made a significant contribution to the develo~ment of 
Maryland law, as well as his opinion in Simard v. White. 1 
Judge Cathell's opinions in the area of zoning and land use defy 
categorization into one of the many schools of jurisprudential 
thought such as pragmatism 13 or literalism. 14 Rather, Judge 
Cathell's opinions are informed by a single unified belief that the 
right to own private property is the foundation of modem 
civilization. As such, the individual's right to hold real property 
privately is fundamental, and the government must forbear 
regulation unless required to protect the fundamental property 
rights of another. 15 In this manner, Judge Cathell recognizes that 
the rights of the individual must, in certain instances, yield to the 
interests of society.16 Thus, according to Judge Cathell, the 
fundamental right to property does not mandate that the individual 
ultimately prevail in his or her quest for judicial relief. 17 
Concomitant with this philosophy, he adheres to the view that 
when a governmental entity seeks to infringe upon an individual's 
right to use property as he or she wishes through zoning 
ordinances, the government bears the burden of proving the 
propriety of the regulation. 18 It is through this lens that I will 
examine how Judge Cathell's beliefs concerning real property are 
embodied in his judicial opinions. 
II. See, e.g., Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 366 Md. 29, 782 A.2d 807 (2001) 
(holding that a parent cannot consent to a minor's participation in a 
non therapeutic study where there is a risk of injury or damage to the health of the 
minor). 
12. 383 Md. 257, 859 A.2d 168 (2004). 
13. Pragmatism is 
an American movement in philosophy founded by [C.S.] Pierce 
and [William] James [that is] marked by the doctrines that the 
meaning of conceptions is to be sought in their practical bearings, 
that the function of thought is as a guide to action, and that the truth 
is preeminently to be tested by the practical consequences of belief. 
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1781 (2002). 
14. Literalism is defined as the "adherence to the explicit substance of an idea or 
expression." WEBSTER'S, supra note 13, at 1231. 
15. See infra Part I. 
16. See itifra Part I. 
1 7. See itifra Part I. 
18. See itifra Part I. 
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I. SIMARD v. WHITE 
In Simard, the Court of Appeals was presented with the 
question of whether a defaulting purchaser at a mortgage 
foreclosure sale is entitled to any surplus proceeds derived from a 
resale arising out of the default. 19 Judge Cathell, writing for the 
Court, exhaustively examined the history of mortgages and 
foreclosures. 20 . In so doing, he iterated his allegiance to the 
philosophy espoused by John Locke 21 and Richard Pipes22 that 
"the great and chief end . .. of Mens uniting into Commonwealths, 
and putting themselves under Government, is the Preservation of 
their Property.,,23 As such, he noted that, despite popular belief to 
the contrary, "the Magna Carta did not initially create private 
property rights in England . . . it protected long extant private 
property rights,,,24 which include "[t]he right of land owners to 
pledge their parcels as security for debt.,,25 Tracing the 
development of mortgage foreclosure law from its inception in the 
concept of strict foreclosure;26 which did not acknowledge the 
mortgagor's property interest in the mortgaged property, to modem 
19. 383 Md. 257, 263, 859 A.2d 168, 171 (2004). 
20. Jd. at 260-90, 859 A.2d at 175-87. 
21. John Locke (1632-1704) was a British philosopher whose work was dominated 
by his opposition to authoritarianism. William Uzgalis, John Locke, in THE 
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2005), available 
at http://plato.stanford.eduiarchives/fa1l2005/entrieslIocke/. He adhered to the 
belief that "using reason to try to grasp the truth, and determining the legitimate 
functions of institutions will optimize human flourishing for the individual and 
society both in respect to its material and spiritual welfare." [d. 
22. Richard Pipes, the Baird Research Professor of History at Harvard University, is 
the author of numerous books and essays on Russia. In Property and Freedom, 
Professor Pipes delineates his belief that the structure of government in Western 
Europe and the United States is a direct reflection of their economic history in 
which privately held property was central. See generally RICHARD PIPES, 
PROPERTY AND FREEDOM (1999). In so doing, he examined the dichotomy 
between Western democracies and Russia, which has never had a developed 
system of private ownership, beyond that of the medieval city of Novgorod. [d. 
Echoes of Professor Pipes's historical-economic view reverberate throughout 
Judge Cathell's writings in the area of zoning and land use law. 
23. Simard, 383 Md. at 270 n. 11, 859 A.2d at 176 n.ll (quoting PIPES, supra note 22, 
at 35) (emphasis in original). 
24. [d. 
25. [d. at 269-70, 859 A.2d at 175. 
26. In Simard, Judge Cathell defined a "strict foreclosure": 
By the early 18th Century, and apparently much earlier, a 
mortgagee was considered the owner of the pledged property subject 
to a condition. A debtor who timely paid the debt in full, acquired 
the right to eject the creditor (mortgagee) if necessary, and re-take 
complete title to the property. However, if the debt at any time 
became in default, or the mortgage was otherwise in default, the 
creditor (mortgagee) was considered the owner of all of the property 
free from condition. It did not make any difference whether ninety 
percent or one percent ofthe debt was unpaid and in default. 
383 Md. at 270-71, 859 A.2d at 176. 
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"power to sell,,27 and "assent to decree,,28 clauses, which provided 
some protection to mortgagors, Judge Cathell astutely observed 
that the "early statute recognized that the mortgagor was to retain 
the land not needed to satisfy the debt. It was intended to insure 
that the mortgagor only lost so much of the land as was necessary 
to pay the debt. ,,29 He noted that when the Court of Appeals 
determined that it was impractical to only sell off part of the 
property "because there was no way to determine in advance how 
much property should be offered for sale because there was no way 
to predict what the bids for the property would be,,,30 the "Court 
provided as an alternative that the whole property be sold with 
surplus proceeds going to the mortgagor.,,31 He further argued that 
"the underlying origins of the proper priorities to be applied to 
sums received at any foreclosure sale, be it an initial sale or a 
resale, have been for over two hundred years to primarily protect 
the interests of mortgagors and mortgagees.,,32 Moreover, he 
27. "Power of sale" clauses "expressly stipulate[] in the mortgage that, on default by 
the mortgagor, the mortgagee might sell the property in the manner and on the 
terms specified in the mortgage." Id. at 281,859 A.2d at 182 (quoting RICHARD 
M. VENABLE, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY AND LEASEHOLD ESTATES IN 
MARYLAND 179 (1892)). 
28. "Assent to decree" clauses arose first in Baltimore City pursuant to Chapter 181 
of the Act of 1833, which provided in pertinent part: 
§ 2. And be it enacted, (in order to the facilitating the 
enforcement of mortgages of real property and estate in the city of 
Baltimore), that in all cases of conveyances by way of mortgage of 
lands or hereditaments or chattels real, situate in the city of 
Baltimore, and where in the said conveyances the mortgagor shall 
declare his assent to the passing of a decree as hereinafter mentioned, 
it shall and may be lawful for the mortgagees or their assigns, at any 
time after filing the same to be recorded, to submit to the Chancellor, 
or to Baltimore county court or any Judge thereof, the said 
conveyances or copies under seal of said county court thereof, and 
the said Chancellor or court or Judge aforesaid, may thereupon 
forthwith decree, that the mortgaged premises shall be sold .... 
Richard Venable, in his treatise on Maryland real property, described "assent to 
decree" provisions by stating: 
[t]hat the mortgagor may incorporate in the mortgage an assent 
on his part to the passage of a decree in equity for the sale of the 
property on his default. Under this consent the mortgagee may, 
immediately on taking the mortgage, file an ex parte petition for a 
decree of sale to be made on default; and, immediately on default, the 
trustee appointed in the decree may proceed to make sale in 
conformity with the terms of the decree; or the mortgagee may file 
his ex parte petition after default and have a decree for sale. 
VENABLE, supra note 27, at 180. "Assent to decree" foreclosures are now 
authorized throughout Maryland. Simard, 383 Md. at 284, 859 A.2d at 184 
(citing MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-105 (LexisNexis 2003)). 
29. Simard, 383 Md. at 316, 859 A.2d at 203. 
30. /d. 
31. Id. 
32. [d. at 317, 859 A.2d at 203. 
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noted that "[a]lthough the foreclosure sale cuts off the mortgagor's 
equitable right of redemption, his legal interest in his property does 
not cease until the foreclosure sale is complete and a conveyance 
has occurred.,,33 As such, "[fJull vesting of [the foreclosure sale 
purchaser's] interest, therefore, is subject to his obligation to pay 
which, in turn, is 'subject to the right to enforce the payment of 
any of the purchase money by a resale at the risk of the buyer. ",34 
Because of this recognition and protection of the mortgagor's 
interest in the mortgaged property, Judge Cathell concluded that 
"there is no common-law rule in Maryland that a defaulting 
purchaser is entitled to excess proceeds realized at a resale, nor 
should there be.,,35 Judge Cathell's opinion, therefore, illustrated 
his belief in the fundamental nature of property rights through his 
assertion that a modem mortgage does not divest a mortgagor of 
his or her right to the mortgaged property. 
II. ZONING, VARIANCES, AND SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS 
A. The Purpose and Propriety o/Zoning Regulations 
Judge Cathell's belief that individual ownership of real property 
is sacrosanct except when it must be circumscribed to permit 
another property owner to use and enjoy his or her property 
became apparent early in his tenure on the Court of Special 
Appeals. By way of introduction to the controversy in County 
Commissioners 0/ Carroll County v. Zent,36 Judge Cathell 
explicated his view of the purpose and development of zoning 
regulations: 
The underlying cause of this dispute is the 
inevitable conflict that results during the transition 
of a rural community to a suburban community. 
Circumstances which are accepted as natural and 
normal incidents of a rural society by those who are 
nurtured by an agrarian environment do not always 
match the expectations of bucolic life anticipated by 
suburbanites as they move out to the countryside. 
While new residents may well expect, and accept, 
vistas of fields of waving grain, pastural scenes of 
dairy cattle on the hillside and the rustic ambiance 
of the pond and wetlands area in the meadows, they 
sometimes belatedly discover that the plow 
precedes the grain, manure accompanies the cattle, 
33. Id. at 319, 859 A.2d at 205. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 315, 859A.2d at 203. 
36. 86 Md. App. 745,587 A.2d 1205 (1991). 
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mosquitoes infest the ponds, and the products of the 
fields and animal husbandry must go to market. 
Since the advent of zoning, the conflict between 
rural reality and suburban expectations have been 
refereed by zoning administrators who, all too 
often, have found themselves in the unenviable 
position of reconciling the irreconcilable. 
The zoning law has attempted to serve as a 
mechanism for the resolution of these conflicts and 
to provide for an orderly process that recognizes the 
inevitable transition, while at the same time 
preserving and permitting the continuation of long-
standing practices and customs. The relevant body 
of law governing this transition is the law of 
nonconforming, primary, accessory, and incidental 
uses. When the principles of this body of law are 
properly understood and applied by zoning 
administrators and ultimately trial courts, the 
transition process is successfully managed. 37 
201 
Zen! addressed a dispute concerning the use of a parcel of land 
approximately two acres in size arid zoned '''A' Agricultural 
District.,,38 Since 1923, a bulk milk delivery and distribution 
business was operated on the site to serve the surrounding 
agricultural community. 39 Upon the imposition of zoning 
regulations in Carroll County in 1965, the business became a 
lawful nonconforming use under the applicable ordinance.4o In 
1988, the Board of Zoning Appeals for the county determined that 
the site was a junkyard, due to the owner's maintenance of several 
old delivery trucks which he used as a source of replacement parts 
for his fleet of milk delivery truCkS.41 Moreover, the Board of 
Zoning Appeals declared that the junkyard was not a lawful 
nonconforming use "because it had not registered and thus had not 
been 'certified' as one under the [applicable] ordinance,,,42 and 
therefore, the owner was in violation of the zoning regulations.43 
As Judge Cathell characterized it, "the zoning authorities were 
attempting to order the cessation or reduction of use of the outside 
portions of the property.,,44 
37. Id. at 746-47, 587 A.2d at 1206. 
38. Id. at 747,587 A.2d at 1206. 
39. /d. 
40. Id. at 748, 587 A.2d at 1206. 
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Addressing the merits of the case, Judge Cathell discussed his 
view of zoning ordinances: 
Such ordinances are in derogation of the 
common law right to so use private property as to 
realize its highest utility, and while they should be 
liberally construed to accomplish their plain 
purpose and intent, they should not be extended by 
implication to cases not clearly within the scope of 
the purpose and intent manifest in their language . . 
.. Zoning is an exercise of the police power and, to 
be valid, must be in the general public interest for 
promotion of health, safety or general welfare of the 
community. It is an exercise of the police power 
which takes away, for public good, some rights of 
individuals to use their property as they please 
while giving them rights to restrict injurious uses of 
others' property. 45 
Consistent with his philosophy concerning the paramount 
importance of the protection of individual property rights for the 
continuation of civilization and the consonant viewpoint expressed 
in the Court of Appeals' precedents, Judge Cathell concluded that 
"the County has attempted to eliminate an incidental and accessory 
use, which is inherently attached to a nonconforming use, by the 
ploy of administrative redefinition.,,46 He determined that in order 
for the County to terminate the "offensive" operations at the site, it 
would have to "reduce[] the nonconforming use by statute or other 
proper regulation,,,47 which it did not do. 
Judge Cathell further stated that "the use described in the case at 
bar was attendant, concomitant, and customary to the primary use 
of the property [and] was thus incidental to, or accessory to, the 
primary nonconforming use.,,48 As such, he opined that "when a 
use does not change the basic nature of the primary permitted 
nonconforming use and is truly incidental to, and supports the 
nonconforming use, it is an accessory use and, unless expressly 
prohibited by statute, is permitted.,,49 Reaffirming his belief in the 
45. Id. at 751, 587 A.2d at 1208 (quoting Landay v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 173 Md. 
460,466, 196 A.2d 293, 296 (1938); Lone v. Montgomery County, 85 Md. App. 
477,494-95,584 A.2d 142, 150-51 (1990)). 
46. Id. at 752, 587 A.2d at 1208. See also Zent, 86 Md.App. at 752 nA, 587 A.2d at 
1208 nA ("We believe it to be equally true that so long as a valid nonconfonning 
use exists, it cannot nonnally be eliminated by a transmogrificational 
reinterpretation by administrative officials."). 
47. Id. at 752, 587 A.2d at 1208-09. 
48. Id. at 768-69, 587 A.2d at 1217. 
49. Id. at 769,587 A.2d at 1217. 
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need for procedures to insure the fair and circumscribed 
application of zoning regulations, he observed that 
[t]here are appropriate methods for eliminating 
nonconforming uses, but terminating 
nonconforming property rights by bureaucratic 
redefinition is not one of them. This type of 
decision, fraught as it is with the emerging conflicts 
between the vanishing agricultural character of the 
County and its emerging suburban character, is a 
policy-making decision best made in an arena 
permitting full public debate by policy-makers-the 
elected representatives-not by the professional 
planners and zoners who only apply that policy. 50 
Requiring the legislative body to alter the zoning regulatory 
scheme affords the most protection to the rights of landowners 
affected by the ordinances and simultaneously provides a means 
for the community to determine the path of its development. 
Judge Cathell's reasoning in City of Annapolis v. Waterman 51 
further illustrates the way in which his view of the importance of 
private property rights, and the circumstances in which such rights 
may be affected through legitimate exercises of governmental 
regulatory power, informs his writings in the area of zoning and 
land use law in Maryland. 
In Waterman, the appellees sought to develop a tract of land 
located in Annapolis. 52 When development of the first section of 
the land was approved in the 1970's, the City of Annapolis 
approved the plan contingent upon the Watermans' agreement to 
provide a specific amount of recreational area in the 
development. 5 During the following twenty years, the Watermans 
failed to include the required recreational area and attempted to 
comply through an open space easement across the rear of the 
eight duplex units planned for the remaining parcel of land. 54 The 
Planning and Zoning Commission recommended a reduction in the 
number of units and found that the final phase of development 
violated the recreational area condition. 55 The Board of Appeals 
affirmed. 56 
50. [d. at 770, 587 A.2d at 1217. 
51. 357 Md. 484, 745 A.2d 1000 (2000). 
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Responding to the Watermans' argument that the recreational 
area condition amounted to an unconstitutional taking, Judge 
Cathell, writing for a unanimous court, discussed the need and 
propriety of such governmental regulation: 
How can a county effectively plan for capital 
expenditures for roads, schools, sewers, and water 
facilities if, without regard to preexisting plans, a 
developer, ... might place a settlement of 1,200 or 
more people in the middle of a previously 
undeveloped area, a settlement which would 
overtax school facilities and which would 
necessitate improvement of a road whose 
construction had not been contemplated 
Planning would be futile in such situations. 
In those instances, the developer, not the 
constituted authority of the county, is in control of 
planning for the future of the county .... 57 
He further noted several basic principles of governmental 
regulatory authority: 
After the close of the Revolutionary War, the 
ownership of property in this country has frequently 
been referred to as "allodial" in nature or that the 
property is held by "allodial tenure." In its strict 
sense, "allodium" means land owned absolutely, 
and not subject to any rent, service, or other tenurial 
right of an overlord; however, it has been, and is, 
uniformly recognized throughout this country that 
the ownership of property is subject to the rights of 
the government to tax the property, to regulate 
reasonably its use and enjoyment under the police 
power of the States, and to take the same, upon 
payment of the value thereof, when needed for a 
public purpose . . .. It is an accurate statement to 
say that every restriction upon the use and 
enjoyment of property is a "taking" to the extent of 
such restriction; but every "taking" is not a "taking" 
in a constitutional sense for which compensation 
need be paid. 58 
57. Id. at 496, 745 A.2d at 1006 (quoting Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Gaster, 285 Md. 
233,248-50,401 A.2d 666, 674 (1979)). 
58. !d. at 497, 745 A.2d at 1006-07 (quoting Stevens v. City of Salisbury, 240 Md. 
556,562-63,567,214 A.2d 775, 778, 781 (1965)). 
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He noted that recreational open space conditions consistently have 
been found to be reasonable. 59 Moreover, because he concluded 
that the recreational area condition did not satisfy the definitions of 
a dedication60 or an exaction,61 the Watermans would have to 
satisfy the test for an unconstitutional taking, which they did not. 62 
Judge Cathell again exhibited his reasoned approach to balancing 
the interests of the individual landowner against those of the 
government through his careful reasoning and examination of the 
issues in the case at bar. 
B. Delineating "Self-Inflicted Hardship" 
In Cromwell v. Ward,63 Ward sought a height variance for an 
accessory building that he had already erected in violation of a 
fifteen-foot height limit in Ruxton, Baltimore County. 64 The 
Board of Appeals, which was affirmed by the Circuit Court for 
Baltimore County, determined that the fact that Ward had to 
construct the building in violation of the zoning regulation 
concerning the height of buildings so that he could achieve a roof 
pitched at the angle that he desired, made the property's problems 
. 65 umque. 
In reaching his holding that a variance should not have been 
granted, Judge Cathell determined that the fact that the building 
was in violation of the height ordinance was a "self-inflicted 
hardship,,66 on the part of the property owner, and any "practical 
difficulty" or "unnecessary hardship" due to that building was not 
the result of a unique or unusual characteristic of the property that 
distinguished it from the surrounding parcels. 67 Were the Court to 
conclude otherwise, according to Judge Cathell, it would render 
zoning regulations meaningless. 68 
Ultimately, he determined: 
59. /d. at 500-01,745 A.2d at 1008-09. 
60. "[C]ommon-Iaw dedications are voluntary offers to dedicate land to public use, 
and the subsequent acceptance, in an appropriate fashion, by a public entity." Id. 
at 503, 745 A.2d at 1010. 
61. "A subdivision exaction ... is a type of subdivision regulation that requires 
developers to make public improvements or install public facilities (or to finance 
them) at their own expense." /d. at 505, 745 A.2d at lOll (quoting 13 RICHARD 
R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY ~ 873(2)(d)(ii), at 79D-33 (MB ed., 
1998» (emphasis added). 
62. City of Annapolis, 357 Md. at 532, 745 A.2d at 1025. 
63. 102 Md. App. 691,651 A.2d 424 (1995). 
64. /d. at 694-95, 651 A.2d at 425-26. 
65. Id. at 695, 651 A.2d at 426. 
66. Judge Cathell defined "self-inflicted hardship" as "arising as a result of the act of 
the owner," which "will be regarded as having been self-created, barring relief." 
Id. at 706, 651 A.2d at 432. 
67. Id. at 721-22, 651 A.2d at 439-40. 
68. Id. at 722, 651 A.2d at 439-40. 
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It is not the purpose of variance procedures to 
effect a legalization of a property owner's 
intentional or unintentional violations of zoning 
requirements. When administrative entities such as 
zoning authorities take it upon themselves to ignore 
the provisions of the statutes enacted by the 
legislative branch of government, they substitute 
their policies for those of the policymakers. That is 
improper. 69 
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Once again, Judge Cathell asserted the proper role of the zoning 
board is to apply the statutorily defined limits of the zoning 
regulations and to insure that the appropriate standard is used in 
granting variances so that the property rights of neighboring 
landowners are afforded equal protection. Moreover, his 
conclusion in Cromwell reflects his understanding that one of the 
purposes of zoning ordinances is to avoid conflicts between 
proximate landowners over the use of their respective properties. 70 
Judge Cathell revisited the issue of self-created hardship with 
respect to variances in Richard Roeser Professional Builder, Inc. v. 
Anne Arundel County.71 In Roeser, the builder was a "contract 
purchaser of two lots near Annapolis.,,72 One of the lots was 
located in the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area "buffer" zone 
adjacent to wetlands, which the contract purchaser knew at the 
time of purchase. 73 The builder-purchaser was also aware that it 
would need to obtain variances to build a house of the size it 
planned. 74 The builder applied for those variances, and the Board 
of Appeals for Anne Arundel County denied the request, 
determining that the hardship was self-created. 75 The Circuit 
Court for Anne Arundel County reversed the judgment of the 
Board and concluded that the fact that the purchaser knew of the 
zoning restrictions at the time of purchase did not render the 
hardship self-created. 76 The Court of Special Appeals, in turn, 
reversed the decision of the Circuit Court and held that· the 
hardship was indeed self-created by the purchaser. 77 
69. ld. at 726, 651 A.2d at 441. . 
70. See County Comm'rs of Carroll County v. Zent, 86 Md. App. 745, 751, 587 A.2d 
1205,1208 (quoting Lone v. Montgomery County, 85 Md. App. 477, 494-95,584 
A.2d 142 (1990». 
71. 368 Md. 294, 793 A.2d 545 (2002) ("Roeser"). 
72. ld. at 296, 793 A.2d at 547. 
73. Id. 
74. /d. 
75. Id. at 296-97, 793 A.2d at 547. 
76. Id. at 297-98, 793 A.2d at 547-48. 
77. Id. at 298-99, 793 A.2d at 548. 
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Judge Cathell, writing for a unanimous court, detennined that 
although "a purchaser of property acquires no greater right to a 
variance than his predecessor, he should not be held to acquire 
less." 78 Quoting with favor from the Court of Appeals of 
Minnesota's opinion in Myron v. City of Plymouth, 79 he reasoned 
that: 
The problem with such a reading of the statute[, 
specifically that a subsequent purchaser who knew 
of the need for a variance at the time of purchase 
could not receive one because the hardship was self-
created,] is that-by backspin-it places an 
unreasonable limitation on the power of cities to 
grant variances, for although the statute provides 
authority to grant variances when certain 
prerequisites are met, it also creates a mirror image 
limitation on the authority to grant a variance 
whenever the stated prerequisites are not met. One 
of those prerequisites is that the need for the 
variance not be 'created by the landowner.' If that 
includes mere purchase with knowledge, a [city] 
would, in effect, be prohibited from granting a 
variance to every subsequent owner who purchased 
with knowledge that a variance would be required 
for development. 
More significantly, such a reading is also 
inconsistent with the general property-law goal to 
preserve alienability. An owner who did not self-
create a hardship is eligible for a variance. But that 
owner would, in effect, be barred from selling to 
someone else without, as a consequence of the sale, 
destroying the eligibility to receive a variance. We 
see no reason why an owner who sells should not be 
able to convey to a buyer the eligibility for a 
variance along with the land itself. 80 
According to Judge Cathell, self-created hardship does not 
generally arise from purchase alone, but rather requires some 
action by the landowner that creates the hardship, 8 1 such as 
building a structure that violates the zoning regulations without a 
78. Id. at 303, 793 A.2d at 551 (quoting 3 ARDEN M. RATHKOPF & DAREN A. 
RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 58.22, at 141-48 (Edward H. 
Ziegler, Jr. rev. ed., West 1991». 
79. 562 N.W.2d 21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). 
80. Roeser, 368 Md. at 307,793 A.2d at 553 (quoting Myron, 562 N.W.2d at 23). 
81. Id. at 314, 793 A.2d at 558. 
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permit and then belatedly seeking a variance,82 or subdividing a 
larger parcel into smaller lots, with one nonconforming lot. 83 
Judge Cathell explicated the basic principles that are the 
foundation of property law, and in so doing, again expressed his 
belief that the right to hold and sell real property is fundamental. 
He explained: . 
[R ]easonable zoning limitations are always directed 
to the property, itself, and its uses and structures, 
not to the completely separate matter of title to 
property, which is another whole field of law. In 
zoning, it is the property that is regulated, not the 
title. 
In Maryland, when title is transferred, it takes 
with it all the encumbrances and burdens that 
attached to title; but it also takes with it all the 
benefits and rights inherent in ownership. If a 
predecessor in title was subject to a claim that he 
had created his own hardship, that burden, for 
variance purposes, passed with the title. But, at the 
same time, if the prior owner has not self-created a 
hardship, a self-created hardship is not 
immaculately conceived merely because the new 
owner obtains title. 84 
Thus, Judge Cathell declared the Court's adherence to the modem 
rule regarding the interaction between the precept in property law 
that a purchaser steps into the shoes of the seller and zoning 
regulations. 
Judge Cathell further emphasized the definition of "self-
created" hardship in Stansbury v. Jones. 85 In Stansbury, Ms. 
Stansbury possessed a tract of land that had been recorded as a 
subdivision prior to Anne Arundel County's adoption of a 
subdivision ordinance. 86 The County subsequently passed an 
ordinance that caused the lots in the subdivision to become 
substandard sized lots and required the lots to be combined to meet 
the lot area requirement. 87 A re-division of the land pursuant to 
the ordinance resulted in the creation of a lot in a critical area, 
which Ms. Stansbury reserved to herself, that could not be 
82. Id. at 314-15, 793 A.2d at 558 (discussing Salisbury Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. 
Bounds, 240 Md. 547,214 A.2d 810 (1965)). 
83. !d. at 316, 793 A.2d at 559 (discussing Randolph Hills, Inc. v. Montgomery 
County, 264 Md. 78,285 A.2d 620 (1972)). 
84. Id. at 319, 793 A.2d at 560-61. 
85. 372 Md. 172,812 A.2d 312 (2002). 
86. Id.atI78,812A.2dat315. 
87. !d. 
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developed until it passed a percolation test. 88 Ms. Stansbury 
needed area variances to build a residence on the parcel and a 
zoning administrator recommended that the variances be granted. 89 
The Board of Appeals denied the variances because it determined 
that Ms. Stansbury's hardship was self-created.9o The Circuit 
Court for Anne Arundel County remanded the case back to the 
Board with instructions to consider all of the factors contained in 
the zoning regulations when reconsidering the application. 91 The 
Court of Special Appeals reversed the judgment of the Circuit 
Court and held that the hardship was self-created and that no other 
factors needed to be considered.92 
Writing for a five Judge majority, Judge Cathell reiterated his 
reasoning in Roeser 3 concerning the nature of self-created 
hardship. He noted that the action taken in the present case was 
permitted and encouraged by the government. 94 As such, he states, 
"that action cannot be characterized as self-created.,,95 The only 
restriction imposed on the parcel was that it pass the percolation 
tests, and thus, according to Judge Cathell, "[t]here was no 
evidence that the county had imposed any conditions forbidding 
petitioner from seeking variances.,,96 
Moreover, he concluded that it "must be borne in mind the often 
repeated doctrine that doubts should be resolved in favor of the 
unr~stricted use of property.,,97 This axiom is reflective of his 
understanding that "[ c ]ourts will naturally lean in favor of freedom 
of the property.,,98 
C. Adopting the Merger Doctrine 
Judge Cathell's first case involving zoning ordinances upon his 
ascension to the Court of Appeals was Friends of the Ridge v. 
Baltimore Gas and Electric Co. 99 In that case, Baltimore Gas and 
Electric Company ("BGE") operated a substation at the 
intersection of Falls and Ridge Roads in Baltimore County and 
applied for a special exception to the Baltimore County zoning 





93. See supra note 71; Stansbury, 372 Md. at 172,812 A.2d at 312. 
94. See Stansbury, 372 Md. at 201,812 A.2d at 329. 
95. ld. 
96. ld. at 203-04,812 A.2d at 331. 
97. !d. at 203, 812 A.2d at 330 (quoting Woodlawn Beach Prop. Owners' Ass'n v. 
Worley, 253 Md. 442, 449.-550, 252 A.2d 827, 831 (1969)). 
98. Id. (quoting Peabody Heights Co. v. Wilson, 82 Md. 186, 203, 32 A. 386, 389 
(1895)). 
99. 352 Md. 645, 724 A.2d 34 (1999). 
210 Baltimore Law Review (Vol. 36 
ordinances to increase capacity at the substation. loo BGE received 
the special exception without challenge. IOI The utility company 
acquired two parcels adjacent to the original substation and 
planned to extend the enlarged substation onto one of the 
contiguous parcels. 102 Petitioner challenged the proposed enlarged 
substation on the grounds that the three parcels were not "legally 
combined" because the Baltimore County ordinance required BGE 
to obtain a variance prior to using the three parcels as a single 
property. 103 
Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Cathell observed "[t]hat a 
landowner who clearly desires to combine or merge several parcels 
or lots of land into one larger parcel may do so. One way he or she 
may do so is to integrate or utilize the contiguous lots in the 
service of a single structure or project."I04 In so concluding, he 
adopted, for the first time in Maryland and only with respect to the 
case at bar, the doctrine of merger with respect to contiguous 
parcels of land owned by the same individual or entity. \05 As he 
noted: 
We see no reason why a doctrine that seeks to 
prevent the proliferation or use of nonconforming, 
undersized lots by holding that they have been 
combined or merged into a larger parcel should not, 
as far as zoning is concerned, be applied properly to 
permit the creation, through the combining by use 
of a larger parcel from already conforming smaller 
parcels, without the necessity of official action or 
conveyancing. \06 
Judge Cathell championed the right of an owner of multiple 
contiguous parcels to use the land as a single lot without the need 
to seek approval absent the need for a variance from the ordinances 
governing setbacks or "yards" from the exterior property lines. 107 
As such, his reasoning reflects his conviction that the 
government's ability to infringe on an individual's property rights 
in limited circumstances must be carefully circumscribed to avoid 
abuse. It is also an expression of Judge Cathell's belief that an 
individual should be free to use his or her property as the owner 
100. /d. at 648-49, 724 A.2d at 36. 
101. /d. at 649,724 A.2d at 36. 
102. /d. 
103. /d. 
104. Id. at 658, 724 A.2d at 40. 
105. See id. at 662, 724 A.2d at 42. 
106. Id. at 654, 724 A.2d at 38. 
107. Id. at 662, 724 A.2d at 42. 
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desires as long as it does not negatively impact the property 
interests of others. 
In Remes v. Montgomery County,108 Judge Cathell returned to 
the issue of the merger of two or more contiguous plots owned by 
a single individual or entity. In Remes, a couple owned two 
adjacent parcels of land and used them as one, building a home on 
one lot and constructing a swimming pool, an addition to the 
home, and driveway on the other. 109 When the couple died, the 
property was inherited by their son, who sought to sell one of the 
lots to a developer. 110 A neighbor, in an attempt to thwart the sale, 
sought both a declaratory judgment that the lots had merged and an 
injunction against the sale, which was stayed pending proceedings 
before the Board of Appeals. III The Board determined that the 
lots had not merged. I 12 The Circuit Court for Montgomery County 
affirmed the decision and the Court of Appeals, on its own 
initiative, issued a writ of certiorari prior to any proceedings in the 
intermediate appellate COurt. 113 
The case presented Judge Cathell with the occasion to clarify 
the scope of the holding in Friends of the Ridge. He reasoned that 
"[f]or title purposes, the platted lot lines may remain, but by 
operation of law a single parcel emerges for zoning purposes." 114 
He further stated: 
Thus, zoning merger, in effect, is an adjustment of 
zoning requirements. It has no effect on 
subdivision. Title examiners regularly consider 
aspects of zoning when examining titles in order to 
be able to indicate to purchasers the uses that can be 
made of a property. Those uses have no effect on 
subdivision regulation. One must comply with both 
zoning and subdivision requirements. In the present 
case, the applicant cannot meet zoning requirements 
because of the doctrine of zoning merger and thus, 
while [one of the lots] may be sold, it cannot be 
used, absent zoning variances or other zoning relief, 
if any.ll5 
108. 387 Md. 52, 874 A.2d 470 (2005). 
109. [d. at 57, 874 A.2d at 472-73. 
110. [d. at 58-59, 874 A.2d at 473-74. 
Ill. [d. at 60,874 A.2d at 474. 
112. [d. 
113. [d. at 62,874 A.2d at 475-76. 
114. [d. at 66-67, 874 A.2d at 478 (quoting Friends of the Ridge v. BaIt. Gas & Elec. 
Co., 352 Md. 645, 658, 724 A.2d 34, 34 (1999». 
115. [d. at 67,874 A.2d at 478. 
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Under the facts of the case, Judge Cathell concluded that the 
original owners clearly intended to use the parcels in concert, 
which is the applicable test for zoning merger, and therefore, their 
conduct was consistent with zoning merger. 116 Thus, prior to 
selling one of the lots the owner must seek zoning variances. 117 
Through this case, Judge Cathell formally stated that the doctrine 
of zoning merger is part of the common law of Maryland and 
affirmed the right of a landowner to use his or her contiguous 
parcels in service to each other. I IS 
D. Determining the Standard/or Critical Area Variances 
Judge Cathell's opinions in Belvoir Farms Homeowners Ass 'no 
v. North l19 and White v. North l20 addressed the appropriate 
standard for granting a variance within the Chesapeake Bay 
Critical Area 121 in Anne Arundel County. In Belvoir Farms, the 
Belvoir Farms Homeowners Association ("the Homeowners 
Association") received a variance to permit more than the four boat 
slips allowed by the critical area regulations from the Anne 
Arundel County Board of Appeals. 122 The Chairman of the 
Chesapeake Bay Critical Area Commission appealed the decision 
to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, reversing the grant 
of the variance. 123 
Once again writing on behalf of a unanimous court, Judge 
Cathell concluded that the Board of Appeals used an erroneous 
standard to determine whether the variance should be issued. 124 
He stated that the Board used a "practical difficulties" 125 standard, 
116. Id. at 67-68, 874 A.2d at 478-79. 
117. Id. at 87, 874 A.2d at 490. 
118. /d. at 77-78, 874 A.2d at 484-85. 
119. 355 Md. 259,734 A.2d 227 (1999). 
120. 356 Md. 31, 736 A.2d 1072 (1999). 
121. Judge Cathell provided a thorough explanation of the Chesapeake Bay Critical 
Area Program in White: 
The Critical Area Program is codified in Maryland Code (1974, 
1990 Repl. Vol., 1998 Cum.Supp.), sections 8-1801 to 8-1816 of the 
Natural Resources Article. Respondent [in both White and Belvoir 
Farms] is the Chairman of the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area 
Commission ... an arm of the Department of Natural Resources with 
authority to enforce the Critical Area Program. Title 27 of the Code 
of Maryland Regulations (COMAR) consists of the Commission's 
regulations. 
Id. at 36, 736 A.2d at 1075. 
122. Belvoir Farms, 355 Md. at 263-64,734 A.2d at 230. 
123. /d. at 262, 734 A.2d at 229. 
124. Id. at 265, 734 A.2d at 231. 
125. Although no specific definition of "practical difficulty" is extant in Maryland 
law, "Maryland courts generally have applied the more restrictive hardship 
standard to use variances, while applying the less restrictive practical difficulties 
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when the Anne Arundel County Code mandated that the 
appropriate test was whether an "unwarranted hardship" 126 existed, 
which he found to be synonymous with the "unnecessary or undue 
hardship" standard. 127 He continued in his reasoning to define 
"unwarranted hardship" as the "denial of reasonable use" or the 
"denial of reasonable return" from the land. 128 Distinguishing this 
standard from that applicable to unconstitutional takings, Judge 
Cathell noted that "the purpose of a variance is to protect the 
landowner's rights from the unconstitutional application of zoning 
law.,,129 He qualified this statement by stating that "[t]his does not 
necessarily mean that a variance may only be granted in cases in 
which application of a particular zoning ordinance would result in 
an unconstitutional taking of property," 130 although he noted that 
variances should be granted only in rare circumstances. 131 
In White, a case that, like Belvoir Farms, addressed the issue of 
the appropriate standard for granting variances within the 
Chesapeake Bay Critical Area, Anne Arundel County authorities 
determined that the property owned by Mr. and Mrs. White was 
within an expanded buffer area, as defined by the Anne Arundel 
County Code in resRonse to the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area 
Protection Program. 32 Within that buffer, the Chesapeake Bay 
Critical Area Commission bans "any new development of all 
'impervious surfaces' that are not 'water-dependent,' which 
includes concrete swimming pools.,,133 The Whites sought a 
variance to install an in-ground swimming pool, which was denied 
by an administrative hearing officer. 134 The Board of Appeals 
reversed the decision and granted the variance. I35 
standard to area variances because use variances are viewed as more drastic 
departures from zoning requirements." Jd. at 275 n.lO, 734 A.2d at 236-37 n.l0. 
126. "Unwarranted hardship" is synonymous with "unnecessary hardship," which the 
Court of Appeals has defined as occurring when "the applicable zoning 
restriction when applied to the property in the setting of its environment is so 
unreasonable as to constitute an arbitrary and capricious interference with the 
basic right of private ownership." Jd. at 276, 734 A.2d at 237 (quoting Marino v. 
Mayor of Bait., 215 Md. 206, 217, 137 A.2d 198,202 (1957». 
127. Jd. at 265-67,275-76,734 A.2d at 231-32,236-37. 
128. Jd. at 277,734 A.2d at 237-38. 
129. !d. at 281,734 A.2d at 240 (citing Packer v. Hornsby, 267 S.E.2d 140, 142 (Va. 
1980». 
130. Jd. 
131. Jd. at 276-77, 734 A.2dat 237. 
132. White v. North, 356 Md. 31, 38, 736 A.2d 1072, 1076-77 (1999). Anne Arundel 
County Code, Article 28, Section 1A-I04 (a)(1) provides in pertinent part, "[i]f 
there are contiguous slopes of 15% or greater, the buffer shall be expanded ... to 
the top of the slope ... and shall include all land within 50 feet of the top of the 
bank of steep slopes." 
133. White, 356 Md. at 38, 736 A.2d at 1076. 
134. !d. at 39-40, 736 A.2d at 1077. 
135. !d. at 40,736 A.2d at 1077. 
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Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Cathell concluded that the 
Board of Appeals was required to use the "unwarranted hardship" 
standard as delineated in Belvoir Farms. 136 As such, he stated that 
the Whites, on remand, must present evidence regarding whether 
"the denial of their request to build a swimming pool is a denial of 
a reasonable and significant use."m Quoting Landay v. Board of 
Zoning Appeals,138 Judge Cathell urged the parties to remember 
that "[i]n a constitutional sense, the only justification for the 
restrictions ... on the use of private property is the protection of 
the public health, safety, or morals.,,139 Where, however, such 
regulations have been enacted, the landowner seeking approval to 
use his or her land in derogation of those regulations bears the 
burden of proving why such a variance should be granted. 140 
Thus, Judge Cathell posits a paradigm of shifting burdens. The 
governmental entity first must establish that the regulation 
promotes the safety, health, or welfare of the community. Once 
such a purpose is found to exist, then the landowner who seeks 
permission to act in violation of the regulation must prove that the 
regulation, in most cases due to the unique characteristics of the 
subject property, creates an undue hardship. In this way, the 
competing interests are balanced against one another and each is 
afforded protection under the law. 
E. Statutory Construction and the Vested Right to a Variance 
In Marzullo v. Kahl, 141 Judge Cathell had the opportunity to 
address the question of whether a landowner, who relies on an 
improperly granted permit, has a vested right to use his property in 
violation of a zoning ordinance. 142 The respondent, Peter Kahl, 
used his parcel of land in Baltimore County for his residence and 
the operation of a business that bred, raised, and sold reptiles, 
includin~ pythons and boa constrictors, after receiving a permit to 
do SO.14 The petitioners, Mary Pat Marzullo and the People's 
Counsel for Baltimore County, petitioned for a special hearing 
before the Zoning Commissioner of Baltimore County to 
determine whether the zoning regulations permitted such a use. 144 
The Commissioner determined that the use was permitted as 
136. Id. at 46, 736 A.2d at 1081. 
137. Id. at 48,736 A.2d at 1082. 
138. 173 Md. 460, 196 A. 293 (1938). 
139. White, 356 Md. at 48, 736 A.2d at 1082 (quoting Landay, 173 Md. at 465, 196 A. 
at 295-96 (citations omitted)). 
140. North v. St. Mary's County, 99 Md. App. 502, 510, 638 A.2d 1175, 1179 (1994). 
141. 366 Md. 158,783 A.2d 169 (2001). 
142. !d. at 193,783 A.2d at 189. 
143. Id. at 160, 162, 783 A.2d at 170-71. 
144. Id. at 160,783 A.2d at 170. 
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"commercial agriculture" under the applicable zoning 
ordinances. 145 The petitioners appealed to the Board of Appeals, 
which reversed the finding of the Commissioner. 146 The Circuit 
Court reversed the decision of the Board of Appeals, determining 
that a re~tile "farm" "was a farming activity that was 
permitted," 47 which was affirmed by the Court of Special 
Appeals. 148 
Judge Cathell concluded that the Board of Appeals correctly 
determined that the respondent's reptile "farm" was not a "farm" 
as the term is used within the zoning regulatory scheme. 149 
Consistent with the common sense wisdom prevalent throughout 
his writings, he observed: 
One can breed, raise, and sell snakes, but you 
cannot farm them. A snake is no more the 
equivalent of chickens, pigs, cows, goats, and 
sheep, than are lions, tigers, and elephants. In 
arriving at this assumption, we do not rely on 
treatises, scientific documentation, or other 
published works; we rely on common sense. A 
snake, however lovable it may be to some, is not a 
farm animal unless legislatively declared to be such. 
A boa constrictor can be an animal on a farm, but 
that does not make it a "farm animal," any more 
than a fox on the way to raiding the hen house is a 
"farm animal." 150 
He urged a reasoned approach to the interpretation of the law that 
does "not set aside common experience and common sense when 
construing statutes." 151 
Judge Cathell also rejected the respondent's assertion that he 
"obtained a vested right to use his property to raise, breed, and 
keep reptiles or snakes,,,152 when the respondent acted in reliance 
upon the improperly granted permit to conduct such a business. 153 
He concluded that "in the absence of bad faith on the part of the 
remitting official; applicants for permits involving interpretation 
accept the afforded interpretation at their risk." 154 He noted that 
for the right to vest, the landowner would have had to receive a 
145. /d. at 166,783 A.2d at 174. 
146. /d. at 166-67,783 A.2dat 174. 
147. /d. at 160,783 A.2d at 170. 
148. Id. 




153. Id. at 193,783 A.2dat 189. 
154. Id. at 194, 783 A.2d at 190. 
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lawful permit, act in reliance thereon, and suffer under a 
subsequent change in the zoning regulations. 155 In that case, 
according to Judge Cathell, there had been no change to the zoning 
regulations, and subsequently, the permit issued to the respondent 
was not a lawful permit because under the applicable ordinances, 
the respondent could not "conduct his business.,,156 Moreover, 
Judge Cathell opined that a municipality cannot be estopped from 
enforcing its lawful zoning ordinances, regardless of the issuance 
of an improper permit. 157 
III. CONCLUSION 
Examining the myriad of opinions authored by Judge Cathell in 
preparation for this article, I am awestruck not only by his clear 
and lively manner of writing, but also by his seemingly effortless 
ability to make the most arcane and arguably confusing areas of 
law accessible. He has striven to shine a light of rationality into 
the labyrinth of zoning and land use regulations, through 
recognizing and respecting the competing interests involved. In so 
doing, he has illustrated why he has earned the reputation for 
straight-talking and common sense judging, while simultaneously 
being willing and able to address the thorniest of issues. On a 
personal note, I will miss Dale Cathell, next to whom I have sat for 
the entirety of my judicial career. He has provided me with 
guidance, support, and an unwavering friendship. He has emiched 
my legal acumen as he has informed Maryland law and in so 
doing, has comported with John Locke's belief that "[t]he 
improvement of the understanding is for two ends: first, for our 
own increase of knowledge; secondl~, to enable us to deliver and 
make out that knowledge to others.,,1 8 
155. Id. at 192,783 A.2d at 188-89. 
156. Id. at 194, 783 A.2d at 190. 
157. Id. at 199, 783 A.2d at 193. 
158. John Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman 
(1703), reprinted in 3 AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 293 
(1828). 
